War, more than almost any other undertaking, has the potential to define a presidency; for better or worse, war presidents are often judged more on victory or defeat on the battlefield than the nitty-gritty of domestic policy. And in each war, administrations are faced with pivotal choices that can change the course of a war, the country and history. President Obama is faced with such a moment now: he must decide whether to grant a request from his hand picked commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley A. McChrystal, for at least 10,000 more combat troops, thus escalating the operation there. And while Obama inherited the Afghanistan conflict from the previous administration, it is fast becoming his war, and his decision at this important fork in the road will be a pivotal moment for his presidency and our country.

It certainly won’t be an easy call; there is no clear choice. Whatever he decides to do, he will seriously aggravate some part of the political spectrum; escalating involvement risks losing the support of far-left liberals who compose a significant pillar of his political base, both in the legislature and among the public. Additionally, the country is arguably experiencing a sense of war-weariness from eight years of protracted engagements. This fact contributed to Obama’s election in the first place, since he was perceived as the more dovish candidate. Growing frustration with overseas deployments, as well as Obama’s lackluster performance in pushing healthcare reform, may leave his administration without the political capital necessary to implement other policies. On the other hand, if he chooses to keep troop levels as is or reduce them, he could be branded as being soft on terror.

Arguably more important, however, are the repercussions a failure to increase troop levels could have on the situation on the ground. Conditions are tenuous, and the deck is stacked against U.S. forces. Thought to be defeated, the Taliban insurgency has made a steady comeback since Bush began withdrawing resources from Afghanistan to support the surge in Iraq. The Taliban continues to use guerilla tactics and knowledge of Afghanistan’s rough and unyielding terrain to harass and attack U.S. troops and civilians alike. Taliban fighters hide in the mountains, where the only method of travel is often goat paths, and where the U.S.’s impressive arsenal of tanks, vehicles, and high-tech Cold War weaponry is relatively useless. They also operate from bases across the border in tribal regions of Pakistan, much like the Viet Cong’s use of Cambodia during the Vietnam war.

Additionally, Taliban rebels have set up a shadow government mirroring the official one. Kidnappings, killings and other violent crimes are a common fear for Afghanis. Ironically, the Taliban are the only form of authority in some regions, as the central government under Hamid Karzai has made little progress or, indeed, effort to establish rule of law in rural provinces. Afghanis on the whole don’t support the Taliban, but they have seen their lot rise little since the U.S. invasion eight years ago. There are still too few schools, water treatment plants, sewage systems and hospitals. Aid projects that are completed are prime targets for the Taliban. Further, Karzai’s victory in recent elections comes amid widespread accusations of electoral fraud and weakens still more the ability of the Afghan government to rule effectively.

To stabilize the country, Afghanis must begin to see marked improvements in their circumstances, such that they begin to believe in their government. They must feel safe, and they must have access to basic necessities. But the current U.S. strategy focuses primarily on counter-terrorism operations against Al-Qaeda, not nation building, which is what the country sorely needs. And as Bush found in Afghanistan, nation building is a complicated process that is very manpower and resource intensive. It also doesn’t happen overnight, and could be a long and costly ordeal. It is instructive to remember that Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 amounted to their Vietnam, costing them 15,000 lives and mounds of treasure. And with U.S. forces stretched to the breaking point from two protracted wars, it is not entirely certain that the U.S, still recovering from economic crisis and fraught with political polarization, can succeed where Russia failed without major international support, an unlikely massive home-front mobilization program à la World War II, or both. The question may not be whether we should continue the fight, but whether we can. Obama is faced with choosing from two difficult options. His decision will have profound implications for the future of two countries. Let’s hope he weighs it carefully.

Tags: Barack Obama